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ABSTRACT
By using new panel survey data for Estonian firms with matching information for chief
executives, evidence is presented on the determinants of the level of chief executive
compensation during 1993-1997. Findings based on fixed effects models indicate that CEO pay
is: (i)  positively related to size (whether measured by total assets, employment or sales); (ii)
often related to performance when measured by the return on assets or profit margin, but
unrelated to productivity; (iii) strongly linked to firm ownership. Size ela ticities range from 0.03
to 0.05 and performance elasticities average 0.06 (for return on assets) and thus are much smaller
than comparable measures estimated in other studies. The most significant (statistically and
economically) determinant of CEO pay is consistently found to be the ownership structure of the
firm.  CEOs in state-owned firms receive about 10-12% more pay than CEOs  in private  firms,
ceteris paribus, and CEO pay differs by type of private ownership. Compared to state firms, it is
statistically significantly lower in firms owned by employees (by about 15%)  and higher (by 7-
15%) in firms owned by foreigners. These findings are consistent with efficiency wage and
monitoring hypotheses. Together with findings that CEO pay is lower in firms owned by
domestic outsiders and that ownership by managers has no effect on compensation, these
findings provide stronger support for hypotheses that stress the importance of non-pecuniary
motivation.
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3I. Introduction
Researchers have begun to investigate diverse topics concerning  the managerial labor
market during transition that potentially have a vital bearing on the success of overall reform
(Aghion et al., 1994). Key issues  believed to influence enterprise performance include
appropriate reward systems for chief executive officers (CEOs) (e.g. Groves et al., 1995; Jones and
Kato, 1996) and the roles of new versus incumbent managers (e.g. Boycko et al, 1996; Claessens
and Djankov, 1999). Unfortunately, reflecting the limited nature of the available data, our
understanding of actual managerial labor markets during early transition and the provision of hard
data that will inform such debates is confined to a handful of empirical studies that cover a limited
range of countries. i  In this paper, by drawing on new panel dat   for Estonian firms, we extend
the range of available information on the determinants of the level of CEO compensation in
transition countries to a country that is very different than those that have been studied.
The Estonian case is especially interesting since the privatization process has led to the
emergence of firms with very different structures of ownership (Jones and Mygind, 1999). Thus,
for the first time we are able to examine the impact of the role of very different ownership
configurations on executive pay. For example, arguably very different principal-agent
relationships exist in firms which are either state or privately-owned and, for private firms,
depending on whether owners are insiders or outsiders (B ycko et al., 1996). To provide for
optimal monitoring in these differing situations, diverse pay packages for CEOs can be expected to
emerge and to have varying effects. The structure of the paper is as follows.
In the next section we continue by first briefly reviewing some of the key issues that have
appeared in the theoretical and empirical literature concerning management in economies in
transition and then by relating some of these issues to the specific context of transition in Estonia.
Next we describe what are most unusual data---for a panel of firms, with corresponding data at the
chief executive level.  After outlining the empirical strategy we use to test hypotheses on the
4determinants of the level of chief executive pay,  f ndings from these fixed effects models are
reported.
II. Conceptual Framework and Transition in Estonia
The managerial labor market during early transition is believed to have a number of
features. Some of these reflect the legacy of arrangements in Soviet-type economies including
managerial reward systems in which pay was mainly a base wage and the pay of top managers was
a low multiple of the average wage. Theorists have pointed out how these arrangements would be
expected to result in acute incentive and motivational problems for managers (e.g. Bonin, 1976;
Weitzman, 1976).  A substantial gap would emerge between behavior in a proprietary fashion (as
called for under the official ideology) and the reality of risk aversion and the pursuit of a quiet life
(Kornai, 1992).  Partly because of asymmetries in information between managers and planners, a
"ratchet effect" would emerge with extensive managerial slack (e.g. Ickes and Samuelson, 1987;
Litwack, 1991). In turn, several systemic inefficiencies were predicted including diverse
pathologies of production (e.g. Putterman, 1993).
Hence, in order to facilitate successful overall reform during early transition, many have
stressed the crucial importance of reforming incentive systems (e.g. Aghion et al., 1994).  For
instance,  when executive compensation is structured so as to provide pecuniary incentives for
managers to pursue profitability, then arguably more market-oriented managerial behavior would
be encouraged.  In the context of early transition, downsizing of overstaffed state owned firms and
productivity increases appear to be key ingredients of successful reform.  Arguably such
adjustments will be facilitated when executive compensation is structured so as to reward
managers for rational downsizing and productivity increases.
In addition, mainstream theorists have noted the existence of several problems in
managerial labor markets. When information is asymmetric--for example when one party to the
employment relation (usually the principal) has imperfect information about the other party (the
5agent) and obtaining reliable information is costly--  problems associated with moral hazard and
adverse selection are apt to occur. In particular, compared to state-owned- firms, we hypothesize
that potentially there will be acute differences in principal-agent relationships in firms that
continue to be state-owned. Rent-seeking by managers in large state-owned firms can be expected
to be more important than in privatized firms that will be less politicized and in which market
forces will be expected to exert more discipline on CEO compensation.
Furthermore, this principal-agency perspective implies that the form of private ownership
can be expected to be important. For example, to provide for improved monitoring of managers,
firms owned by outsiders in general (and perhaps foreigners in particular) can be expected to be
more likely to pay higher (efficiency) wages and to link pay with firm performance.ii This will
contrast with firms that are owned by employee-insiders who are able to closely monitor executive
performance and who will be expected to be more effective at disciplining managers than in other
private firms. Finally, in firms in which managers are the main owners, it is uncertain whether this
large measure of managerial control will result in greater current income in the form of pay or in
some other form (e.g. profits).
The potential ambiguity of theory concerning the impact of some of the factors typically
thought to influence CEO pay is strengthened by taking into account determinants stressed by
other theorists as well as by taking note of the Estonian transition context. Thus, some have
stressed the potential importance to executive behavior of non-pecuniary motivations (Fre , 1997).
These considerations can be expected to be especially important for particular ownership
configurations. For example, compared to outsider owned firms, employee owned firms have a
greater likelihood of differing value systems and institutional practices such as mechanisms for
employee participation in decision making (H usman, 1996). This tendency can be expected to
produce more compressed wage structures than in other firms with other forms of majority
ownership (Mygind, 1992). This force is especially likely to be present in transition economies
6such as Estonia where egalitarian norms were strong in the past (Mygind, 1996) and which,
because of institutional inertia, can be expected to continue to exert an influence on current pay
structures.
For a number of reasons the case of Estonia is an interesting one to examine concerning the
determinants of executive pay. For one thing, according to many macroeconomic indicators, the
performance of this Baltic tiger has been far  b tter than most former communist countries (Fischer
et al., 1996). Second,  since 1990 the Estonian transition strategy has been quite radical, including
rapid price liberalization and a new competition policy, and thus is reminiscent of "big bang"
experiences elsewhere. Also, the  move to privatization of large state-owned firms was quite rapid
and was quite advanced during the period under study in this paper. In these respects the Estonian
situation is very different than that examined in other work on executive compensation in
transition countries.iii Thus in Bulgaria, until recently, a focus of reform efforts was on
corporatization rather than wholesale privatization. As such the situation confronting Bulgarian
managers was apparently more similar to that confronting Chinese managers compared to
managers of privatized firms in transition economies such as Estonia.. Moreover, nd apparently
unlike the situations in other transition economies for which there is applied work on executive
compensation, this has resulted in the introduction of diverse forms of private ownership (see on).
In addition, unlike in Estonia, in Bulgaria it appears that managerial positions have become part of
the political spoils system and that, to the extent that managers are able to enhance their incomes
through  "shadow firms,"  these are indeed plum positions.  Perhaps most important, because of the
failure to deal with the problem of bad debts, the context within which Estonian managers
operated was nearly always characterized by hard budget constraints–a very different situation
than that which confronted managers of, for example, corporatized firms in Bulgaria, and more
akin to that confronting managers of Czech firms.
III. The Data
7With the cooperation of the central statistical authority in Estonia, annual economic and
financial data were extracted from company records for a stratified random sample of 666 firms
for 1993-1997 to construct a rich panel. These standard economic data, including profits, sales,
assets and  employment,  have been  merged with two special surveys. In one survey, detailed  data
on the distribution of ownership for insiders, available separately for managers and employees, and
outsiders, split into foreigners and domestic outsiders, and the state were collected for this large
panel. By selecting a large sample, we expect to hav   representation of all the main forms of
ownership, as well as firms which had been privatized at different times and firms from a broad
range of  industries.iv  The other survey collected data for a random sub-sample of 220 top
executives in these firms, including information on their compensation packages.
These data enable not only estimation of diverse specifications, but also construction of
measures of key variables. Concerning ownership, at best most previous studies on executive
compensation are able to attempt to classify firms according to whether firms are state or privately
owned. Even studies of transition economies which investigate the impact of different forms of
privatization upon economic performance usually are able to construct measures of which group is
the largest or the dominant shareholder (Frydman et. al. ,1997; Jones, 1998; Earle et. al.,1996).
However, for several reasons, this procedure does not necessarily produce the preferred typology
of ownership forms. For example, dispersed shareholdings within a category may lead to limited
cohesiveness by the dominant ownership group, which may account for as little as 25% of the total
voting stock. Fortunately, in most cases in Estonia, we are able to classify firms based on the
analytically preferable method of majority ownership.
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for key variables for two selected years during
the period under examination, namely the first and last years (1993 and 1997). Firms are classified
according to their ownership status in 1997.v By examining the entries for the whole sample
(column 1) we see that, on average, during 1993-1997, real monthly CEO compensation fell very
slightly, while size (employment and assets) fell much more sharply. While some performance
8measures such as sales also did not change much others, including labor productivity and profits,
deteriorated sharply. vi
From Table 1 we also see that there were great differences in key variables when firms are
classified according to majority ownership. Examining first the changing fortunes of state owned
firms, we see that while they continue to be much larger then other firms, their rate of shrinkage
was also noticeably faster than that of other firms.vii Unlike other firms, they also experienced
rapidly increasing losses during 1993-1997.  CEO pay in state firms suffered enormously too
while performance indicators displayed an uneven record–for example, compare constant labor
productivity and declining margins.
CEO pay was much higher in 1997 in firms owned by foreigners –more than three times as
high as in firms in which employees were majority owners. However, unlike firms owned by
managers and by domestic outsiders, CEO pay in foreign owned firms fell during 1993-1997. By
several  indicators foreign owned firms performed very well, recording sharp gains in real sales
and in profits, though labor productivity declined considerably too. Performance indicators for
other types of firms were often mixed. Thus, productivity and sales grew in employee owned firms
though profits fell.  In firms owned by managers, profits, margins and the return on assets all
improved though sales fell and productivity stagnated. Typically foreign owned firms experienced
greater rates of contraction (especially in employment) than did other privately owned firms.
Finally, we see that pay differences between managers and the average worker (RATIO) were
typically quite modest–about 3:1. Interestingly, during 1993-1997, this ratio fell in foreign owned
firms (as well as in employee owned firms), though it widened somewhat in other private firms. viii
IV. The Relation between Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in
Transition
9To study the determinants of the level of CEO pay we begin by augmenting a standard
chief executive compensation equationix  by a dummy variable indicating whether, during the
period 1993-1997,  the firm remains state-owned.  That is,
lnPayit = bln(SIZEit)+ , (PERFORMANCEit) + g(STATEit) + " i    + Ji    + uit  (1)
where Payit= chief executive pay of firm i in year t;  SIZEit = size of  firm i in year t;
PERFORMANCEit = standard firm performance measures such as various accounting profitability
measures of firm i in year t;  STATEit = 1 if firm i remains state-owned over the 1993-97 period, 0
otherwise;  " i = firm specific fixed effects; and Ji  = year effects.  The disturbance term, ui, we
assume ui - NID(0, s2).
PERFORMANCE and SIZE  are standard variables that have been included in prior
empirical studies of executive compensation in the U.S., the U.K. and other advanced market
economies and in the limited work on transitional economies. In the western literature, the
application of principal agent theory to the design of executive contracts in general predicts a
positive correlation between managerial pay and some observable measure of firm performance
(which eventually translates into improved well-b ing for shareholders). To adequately measure
PERFORMANCE debate in the western literature has usually centered on the respective merits of
measures of stock market returns compared t   v rious accounting measures such as ROA (the
return on assets). However, in a context of embryonic capital markets as in Estonia, this debate is
moot since stock market measures are highly suspect and only very large enterprises are listed on
the stock exchange. Moreover, many have argued (e.g. Pohl t al, 1997; Earle and Estrin, 1998)
that the key performance measure may be labor productivity. Thus, in our empirical work, as well
as two accounting measures, ROA and MARGIN (gross profit/sales), we also consider labor
productivity as an alternative firm performance measure.
The inclusion of a measure of  SIZE in empirical work in western literature usually follows
from theories which stress the importance of factors such as spans of control in determining CEO
pay. For transition economies, another consideration is that under communism being a chief
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executive of a larger firm with many employees often translated into more political power and thus
an improved ability to obtain higher pay. Our data allow us to use three alternative SIZE measures:
(i) EMPLOY(number of workers); (ii)SALES (income from sales in 1993 real kroons); (iii)
ASSET (total assets in real kroons).
On all estimates we use a two-way fixed effects model. Year dummy variables ( ) are
included to capture technological change and other shocks common to all firms as well as possible
measurement errors of inflation. Firm specific effects ( ) are included to capture time invariant
firm specific factors that may affect chief executive pay. x
We estimated nine specifications of equation (1) depending on the selection of the size and
performance measures. Importantly,  for all specifications reported in Table 2,   F tests refute the
joint exclusion of year dummy variables and firm-specific fixed effects at the 1% level. The first
three columns of Table 2 show the results when EMPLOY is used as a size measure, whereas
columns 4-6 report findings using sales as a measure of size and in  the last three columns assets
are used to proxy size. For each size measure, results are reported when the three different
performance measures are used (for example, ROA in columns 3, 5 and 7). Finally, all models
include a dummy variable for whether or not the firm remained state owned throughout the period.
No matter which measure of SIZE is used, evidence is found of a positive and statistically
significant relationship between CEO pay and SIZE. The results are not sensitive to the choice of
the PERFORMANCE measure. Moreover the estimated pay elasticities of size are quite small and
in the range of 0.03-0.05. For example, as sales increase by 10%, CEO pay increases by 0.3 to
0.5%; for assets, the comparable effect is 0.8%. These elasticities are much smaller than those
obtained in other studies. For example, Rosen (1990) in reviewing various western studies on the
estimated elasticity of pay with respect to scale finds a typical value of 0.25 while Jones and Kato
(1997) report elasticities of size of 0.2-0.4 for Bulgaria.
There is mixed support for the existence of a relationship between CEO pay and
PERFORMANCE.   For productivity (ln PROD), no statistically significant relationship is ever
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found.  However, when ROA is used to proxy performance, as hypothesized the relationship is
always found to be positive and in two cases it is also statistically significant. Also, in two of three
cases, evidence is found of a positive and statistically significant relationship between
PERFORMANCE (measured by MARGIN ) and CEO compensation. Again these elasticities are
smaller than those obtained in other studies. Thus, Rosen (1990) finds that the estimated sensitivity
of pay to accounting measures are in the 1.0 to 1.2 range, about twice the size of the estimated
elasticities for Estonia for ROA. However, the finding of statistically significant relationships
between PERFORMANCE (measured by ROA or M RGIN ) contrasts with the case of Bulgaria
where the only significant link was when productivity was used.
Finally from Table 2 we see that there is strong evidence that ownership matters much in
the determination of executive CEO pay. Specifically we see that  CEOs in state firms earn higher
pay then their counterparts in the private sector, even after controlling for size, performance and
other time invariant u observables.  These positive and significant estimates suggest that, after
controlling for firm performance, the average CEO working for a state-owned firms receives
additional rents of  10-12%  as compared to his/her counterpart in privatized firms.  Hence, the
rent earned by state firm CEOs seems to be significant not only statistically but economically. Put
another way, the positive and significant estimates on g can be i terpreted as indicating the
presence of financial discipline which privatization has brought to CEO compensation.
In Table 3 we report our estimates of Equation (2) (when we explicitly examine the impact
of the particular form of private ownership). Importantly, in all nine estimates,  F tests refute the
joint exclusion of year dummy variables, the vector of private ownership dummies and the firm-
specific fixed effects at the 1% level. As in the previous estimates, again we find that most
measures of SIZE have positive and statistically significant effects on the level of CEO pay, other
things equal.  The sizes of the coefficients on the three proxies for SIZE are essentially unchanged
from the previous estimates. However, and unlike findings reported in table2, in these estimates
we find that PERFORMANCE is  statistically significant in only one case (column III).
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Findings for the several forms of individual ownership are very interesting.  The most
consistent findings are for firms in which employees are the majority owners. As hypothesized,
relative to firms in which the state is the majority owner, firms with majority ownership in the
hands of employees pay their managers less, other things equal. The size of the ownership effects
is remarkably consistent across all specifications and averages about 15%. More surprisingly, we
find that managers in which domestic outsiders are the majority also earn a statistically
significantly lower amount  than do managers of firms that are state owned (ranging from 9-12%
depending upon specification). As hypothesized, firms in which ownership lies oversees always
pay their managers more, though the effects of majority ownership b   foreigners are seldom
statistically significantly different than zero. Finally, it appears that once control for size,
performance and time invariant firm specific factors have been introduced that CEO pay in firms
owned by managers is no different than in firms owned by the state.
V. Summary and Implications
Using a panel survey of firms with matching information for chief executives, we study the
determinants of chief executive compensation during an interesting period of transition in the
Estonian economy. Findings based on fixed effects  models indicate that CEO pay is always
positively related to changes in several measures of size (including total assets and employment).
The evidence on the link between CEO compensation and performance is more mixed. Using
measures such as profit margin and ROA often evidence of a positive and statistically significant
relationship is found. However, no link is found between pay and productivity. However,
compared to findings from other studies, the size and performance elasticities typically are quite
small, averaging about 0.04 and 0.06 respectively. These findings suggest that executive
compensation in Estonia is structured so as to provide only weak incentives for managers to
increase firm size and to pay limited attention to current business performance.
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Our most  notable findings concern the effects of ownership on  CEO pay. The most
significant (statistically and economically) determinant of CEO pay is consistently found to be the
ownership structure of the firm.  CEO pay is always higher in firms that remained completely
state-owned (and re not privatized).  This finding is found consistently for all specifications and,
averaging 12%, is quite sizeable.  Together with the weak pay-performance and compensation-size
relationships, this finding suggests that the financial discipline surrounding firms in the state sector
was especially weak. In other words, privatization did lead to stronger discipline on CEO
compensation thus reducing the rent associated with state-owned firms.
Both principal-agent theory and theory based on the importance of non-pecuniary concerns
in influencing CEO pay predict that CEO compensation will differ according to the particular form
of private ownership. For all specifications, in firms in which employees are the majority owners,
CEOs earn about 15% less than do managers of state firms, other things equal.  This disciplining
effect on CEO compensation is also often found in private firms in which domestic outsiders  are
the majority. CEOs in such firms earn about 15% less than do managers of state firms. By contrast,
in firms owned by foreigners CEO pay is found to be higher (by 7-15%), while ownership in firms
owned by foreigners. These findings are consistent with efficiency wage and monitoring
hypotheses. Together with findings that CEO pay is lower in firms owned by domestic outsiders
and that ownership by managers is not found to a fect  compensation. As such these findings
provide stronger support for hypotheses that stress the importance of non-pecuniary motivation.
In some respects our findings are similar to those that have emerged in other studies for
transition economies and suggest the emergence of two stylized facts. First,  there is evidence of a
link between size and executive compensation. This is found not only for Estonia but also for
China Groves et al. (1995) and Bulgaria (Jones and Kato, 1996, 1999). Second, there is consistent
evidence that ownership does matter and that, during early transition, compared to managers of
private firms, managers in state firms receive rents. This finding emerges from studies for several
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countries, with the findings for Estonia, additionally pointing  to the importance of the particular
form of private ownership.
At the same time, the magnitude of these effects often differs considerably. For example,
the size elasticity effect varies considerably (and is especially small in Estonia). In addition, there
is no general finding concerning a link between pay and performance. Thus, whereas in China
there is evidence of such a relationship, in Estonia the evidence on this connection is weaker and
in Bulgaria even moreso (at least during 1993-1995) no such link is found (Jones and Kato, 1999).
In accounting for the differences across countries on these points, clearly the differences in
institutional contexts  matter. In addition, arguably a key consideration behind the failure to find a
link between productivity/profitability and pay in Bulgaria is because, unlike in China, the
performance of the economy has been so chaotic. In such circumstances it was (and probably still
is) premature to find a pay-performance link. This contrasts with findings for Esto ia which are
consistent with the view that transition policy is producing incentives for managers to be
financially disciplined.
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 Appendix
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Means (standard deviation)
1 2 3
N Mean S.D N Mean S.D N Mean S.D
Total State Owned Foreign Owned
CEOPAY93 199 4244 6344 11 6600 3578 38 7153 12710
CEOPAY97 198 4211 5298 11 4490 1420 38 6408 7444
RATIO93 197 2,6 3,4 11 4490 1420 38 3,5 6,2
RATIO97 195 3,1 3,2 11 3,0 1,03 38 2,9 1,8
ENTLOY93 220 138 243 11 571 681 42 89 156
EWLOY97 216 97 160 11 210 288 42 89 140
ASSET93 182 13235 38147 11 62111 95034 32 26836 68673
ASSF,T97 204 9030 26580 11 26588 37827 38 23902 52418
SALES93 220 13891 36969 11 64637 74369 42 22253 66194
SALES97 203 12425 28811 11 34404 72882 38 29225 50091
PROFIT93 220 136 5349 11 -29:7 2850,7 42 -1234 7798
PROFIT97 207 71 2093 11 -4228 7845 39 663 2497
ROA93 182 0,037 0,399 11 0,0849 0,134 32 -0,083 0,88
ROA97 204 0,028 0,247 11 -0,411 0,386 38 0,07 0,177
MARGIN93 220 -0,042 -0,75 11 0,0425 0,0846 42 -0,296 1,6
MARGIN97 203 -0,041 0,412 11 -0,564 0,635 38 0,004 0,134
PROD93 220 169 561 11 132 104 42 529 1211
PROD97 201 128 198 11 132 188 38 312 355
…table continued next page
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4 5 6
N Mean S.D N Mean S.D N Mean S.D
Domestic Owned  Manager Owned Employee Owned
CEOPAY93 71 3961 3853 56 3184 2305 18 2379 1827
CEOPAY97 71 4054 3783 56 3754 5920 17 1795 1055
RATIO93 70 2,7 3 56 2 1 17 2 0,75
RATIO97 69 3,5 3,4 56 3 4,3 16 1,8 0,51
ENTLOY93 79 157 200 59 102 251 22 88 89
EWLOY97 76 122 155 59 71 183 22 52 47
ASSET93 70 10543 18385 49 5680 14920 15 2679 3280
ASSETT97 72 7005 14884 58 2780 6374 20 1841 2150
SALES93 79 12893 22755 59 7701 17124 22 3811 6756
SALES97 72 9478 13815 57 5645 12040 20 3946 4834
PROFIT93 79 1064 6217 59 -135 3092 22 214 360
PROFIT97 72 44 1388 58 143 348 22 146 339
ROA93 70 0,067 0,158 49 0,04 0,21 15 0,107 0,14
ROA97 72 -0,013 0,258 58 0,08 0,24 20 0,07 0,092
MARGIN93 79 0,029 0,415 59 -0,005 0,146 22 0,032 0,098
MARGIN97 72 -0,1 0,62 57 0,035 0,122 20 0,036 0,055
PROD93 79 90 131 59 87 83 22 51 68
PROD97 70 87 110 57 87 85 20 67 71
Notes:
1. All figures are in 1993 kroons and for firms classified by ownership in 1997
2. All variables are defined in the appendix
3. The difference between the total number of firms and firms classified by ownership is the number of firms for
which there was no majority owner. Typically there were five such firms.
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Table 2. The Determinants of the Level of CEO Compensation in State and Private Firms
IndependentDependent variable:  In (CEOPAY) (monthly pay in 1993 Kroons)
Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Intercept 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.60 7.63 7.5 7.27 7.19 7.28
(49.114) (82.7) (81.6) (50.164) (51.767) (49.109) (37.49) (34.15) (37.34)
In 0.056200 0.04419 0.04457
(1.53) (1.888)* (1.887)*
In(SALES) 0.039430.0311700.056093
(2.136)** (1.736)*(2.413)**
In(ASSET) 0.080888 0.07987 0.08106
(3.118)**(2.804)**(3.111)**
MARGIN 0.03786 -0.0031 0.00786
(1.688)* (0.205)** (0.571)
ROA 0.07646 0.063760 0.07017
(1.722)* (1.449) (1.638)
In(PROD) 0.0402 -0.01588 0.022212
(1.537) (0.489) (0.752)
STATE 0.1022 0.105 0.1059 0.12559 0.13607 0.10221 0.1186 0.09929 0.11612
(1.628) (1.688)* (1.679)* (2.2)** (2.392)** (1.628)(2.098)** (1.575)(2.043)**
R2 0.23 0.08 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.30
Sample Size 924 922 886 955 915 924 919 884 915
Notes:
1.Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.
2. * statistically significant at 10% level;  ** statistically significant at 5% leve; *** statistically significnat at the 1%
level
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Table 3. The Determinants of the Level of CEO Compensation in Firms with Different
Forms of Private Ownership
IndependentDependent variable:  In (CEOPAY) (monthly pay in 1993 Kroons)
Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Intercept 7.56 7.759 7.748 7.65 7.727 7.6 7.32 7.23 7.32
(47.8) (75.442) (74.741) (49.21) (51.29) (47.8) (36.4) (33.37) (36.27)
In (EMPLOY) 0.05830 0.047599 0.04749
(2.5)** (2.028)** (2.005)**
In(SALES) 0.038311 0.028470 0.05822
(2.058)** (1.575) (2.495)**
In(ASSET) 0.08421 0.08567 0.08430
(3.213)** (2.99)** (3.202)**
MARGIN 0.03329 -0.00602 0.00458
(1.45) (0.40) (0.334)
ROA 0.07027 0.057650 0.062475
(1.585) (1.309) (1.459)
In(PROD) 0.03618 -0.02205 0.01508
(1.381) (0.679) (0.512)
FOREIGN 0.1162 0.119554 0.1449769 0.08462 0.102001 0.11625 0.06951 0.12945 0.09619
(1.274) (1.312) (1.57) (0.974) (1.161) (1.275) (1.092) (1.403) (1.1)
DOMESTIC -0.09789 -0.099858 -0.09802 -0.11731 -0.12096 -0.09789 -0.10661 -0.08755 -0.1042
(1.559) (1.588) (1.554) (2.018)** (2.085)** (1.559) (1.844)* (1.392) (1.799)*
MANAGER -0.00973 -0.01417 -0.019114 -0.025988 -0.03752 -0.009704 -0.021705 -0.00147 -0.01603
(0.139) (0.202) (0.272) (0.388) (0.563) (0.138) (0.327) (0.021) (0.241)
EMPLOYEE -0.14826 -0.1491 -0.15328 -0.16008 -0.16809 -0.14822 -0.16749 -0.149807 -0.16369
(1.879)* (1.888)* (1.943)* (2.109)** (2.225)** (1.879)* (2.234)** (1.2) (2.176)**
R2 0.28 0.18 0.2 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.35
Sample Size 924 922 886 955 915 924 919 884 915
Notes:
1.Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.
2.* statistically significant at 10% level;  ** statistically significant at 5% level
3. The inclusion of all ownership dummies in all specifications is significant at the 5% level
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Definitions of Variables
CEOPAY = real monthly salary of CEO (1993 kroons)
RATIO= (CEOPAY/ average monthly salary of all employees)
EMPLOY= employment
ASSET= real total assets (thousands1993 kroons)
SALES= real sales (thousands 1993  kroons)
PROFIT= real profits (thousands 1993 kroons)
ROA= rate of return on assets =PROFIT/ASSET
MARGIN = real profit margin (thousands 1993 kroons)
PROD = real sales per worker (thousnads1993 kroons)
STATE = 1 if majority owner is state, 0 otherwise
FOREIGN=  1 if majority owners are foreigners, 0 otherwise
 DOMESTIC=  1 if majority owners are domestic outsiders (e.g. firms registered in Estonia,
individual Estonians who do not work at the firm), 0 otherwise
EMPLOYEE= 1 if majority owners are non-managerial employees, 0 otherwise
MANAGER= 1 if majority owners are managers, 0 otherwise
Notes:
1.The value of the kroon varied from X-Z kroons   per  $ during 1993-1997.
2. Deflators are taken from EBRD (1998).
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Notes
                                         
i Concerning the design of CEO pay packages, some of the most influential empirical work is by
Groves et al. (1994, 1995) who, in examining the case of China, present evidence to show how
contract features such as performance based compensation are associated with gains in firm's total
factor productivity. For the former communist countries, Jones and Kato (1996) draw on panel
survey data for a large sample of Bulgarian firms and find that the level of CEO pay was
positively related to size and productivity (especially when the firm was either corpor tized o
privatized) but not to profitability. On the effect of new managerial blood see B ycko t al.
(199X) and Claessens and Djankov (1999).
ii However, if firms are largely owned by outsiders but firms are part of groups, then institutions
connected to the group may play a monitoring role. See Kato for a discussion of the Japanese
case.
iii For China see Groves (19...), for the Czech Republic (Dajnkov and Claessens (1999) and for
Bulgaria, Jones and Kato (1997, 1999).
iv 3.  Thus we include some firms that were never privatized and also some privatized firms in
which the state remained the majority owner during the period of study.
v Considerable chnages in ownership took place in ownership configurations of Estonian firms
during this period. See Jones and Mygind (1999).
vi  The enormous variation in values for most variables (see the standard errors) and reporting
means for an balanced panel accounts for the apparent inconsistencies in some of the trends
highlighted in Table 1. For example, while productivity falls sharply while sales are essentially
flat and employment drops considerably.
vii However, in part reflecting the small size of the Estonian economy, Estonian firms have
always been much smaller than their counterparts in, for example, the former USSR. In turn,
presumably this translated into comparatively less ov rmanning at the start of transition.
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viii As such this ratio of CEO/average worker pay  is rather lower than what has been reported for
western countries though comparable to what has been observed for some transition economies.
Thus Kato and Rockel (1992) report comparable ratios for Japan of 13 and for the US of 32 while
the comparable ratio in Bulgaria in 1993 was 2.9 (Jones and Kato, 1996).
ix See, for instance, Murphy (1998) for a discussion of standard chief executive compensation
equations.
x Unfortunately we do not have information on individual CEO attributes such as experience and
education. Nevertheless we also estimated cross sectional models. But always models with firm
specific effects were preferred (see on). )These cross sectional estimates are available from the
authors upon request).
